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Overview
• Broad evidence that normative influence and descriptive norms 
(Bicchieri 2006, Cialdini 1998) increase prosocial behavior:
−energy-saving (Schultz et al. 2007)
−abstaining from littering (Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren 1990)
−abstaining from bribing officials (Corbacho et al. 2016)
• Highly relevant in social dilemma situations where private and collective 
interests clash, resulting in suboptimal individual and collective 
outcomes (Dawes 1980)
• I apply the “descriptive norms messaging” approach to a social dilemma 
of high substantial relevance: the procurement of donor organs and its 
underlying decision problem, that is, individuals’ (not) consenting to 
post-mortem organ donation. 
• Research question: Does exposing individuals to descriptive norm 
messages regarding the consent rate in the population result in an 
change in stated consent?
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The problem: Donor organ shortage
• Organ shortage a pervasive problem in Western countries
• In the US, every day 22 persons on the waiting list die (U.S. Dept. Of 
Health & Human Services 2016)
https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/
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The problem: Donor organ shortage
• Main organ source are «brain dead» patients (“post-mortem donation”)
• Therefore, consent rate to post-mortem donation is crucial for organ 
supply.
• Stated consent is far away from 100% (77% according to one study in 
Germany, but much less have a donor card or another explicit 
corresponding statement).
• Also, only about two thirds of potentially qualified brain dead patients 
actually become organ donors. The rest did not, mainly due to lacking 
consent. (DSO Germany, 2015)
• Hence, to increase consent rates to post-mortem donation is widely 
acknowledged as the primary mean to increase the organ supply.
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Organ procurement as a social dilemma
• Decision to consent to post-mortem donation or not can be regarded as 
a public good game situation:
− contributing, e.g. giving consent,
− vs. not contributing, e.g. refusing consent.
• Donor organs are a (rival) public good and there is a free-riding 
incentive: 
−Consenting to donation produces a common benefit.
−But, it causes private costs:
• incurring (irrational) fears
• being forced to think about one’s own premature death
• putting burden on relatives
• losing the body integrity after death
• obtaining and filling out a donor card (in opt-in regimes). 
• As a result, contributions are below the efficient level, the good is 
under-supplied  lack of organs, waiting lists, people suffering and 
dying
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How to motivate (more) individuals to become donor?
• Introducing a presumed consent regime (see Johnson and Goldstein 
2003)
• Compensation for donors/donors’ families
• Prioritization of donors on waiting lists (Israel, “donor clubs” in the US)
• Mandated choice (some US states)
• Most frequent measure: public awareness campaigns
 could social norm approaches improve such campaigns, increase 
consent rates, and expand the pool of potential donors?
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Social norms and prosocial behavior
• Social norms are informal rules 
enforced by, often subtle, sanctions 
or by internalized feelings of guilt: 
what one ought (not) to do 
(Hechter and Opp 2001).
• At the individual level, norms exert 
their influence by way of subjective 
expectations/beliefs.
• Widespread distinction by Cialdini, 
Reno and Kallgren (1990) between
−injunctive norms: beliefs about what 
people («others») approve or 
disapprove
−descriptive norms: beliefs about what 
people («others») actually do
Sign not to build stone heaps (cairns) in the foreground
and completed cairn in the background, Iceland 2015
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Social norms and prosocial behavior
• Individuals follow social norms out of different motives
−fear of sanctions
−conformity/imitation (Sherif 1936)
−reciprocity or conditional norm following (i.e. Bicchieri and Xiao 2009)
• While some norms are always firm in place, others must be activated 
first to exert their influence in a particular situation (Bichhieri 2006, 
Lindenberg and Steg 2007).
• Two main strategies to manipulate behavior using social norms:
−«focusing» people on a particular norm
−altering «descriptive norms» by providing individuals with information on the 
prevalence of a particular behavior
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The effect of descriptive norms
• Empirical findings show that descriptive norms can foster prosocial 
behavior
−in laboratory experiments (giving in DG, Bicchieri and Xiao 2009)
−in field experiments (Corbacho et al. 2016, Cialdini and Goldstein 2004)
• Descriptive norms promote prosocial behavior only, if they convey the 
message that a sufficiently large part of others conform.
• Otherwise, less norm conformity might result (e.g. Diekmann et al. 
2015, Keizer et al. 2008)
• Depending on the strength of the descriptive norm message (e.g. 
different presented prevalence rates), gradually different effects on 
norm following have been observed (Kormos, Gifford and Brown 2014).
• Heterogeneous treatment effects for 
−under- vs. over-estimators (Diekmann et al. 2013, Rauhut 2013)
−participants with strong vs. weak (or no) pre-existing preferences on the 
behavior under question (Stutzer, Goette and Zehnder 2011)
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The study: A descriptive norm manipulation experiment
• Subjects: 551 members of a non-representative German online panel
• Outcome measures: 
−stated consent to post-mortem organ donation 
−behavioral measure: clicking on a button opening a donor card solicitation 
page
• Descriptive norm treatment: Exposure to survey results on the general 
willingness to donate organs after death
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Outcome measures
• Stated consent to post-mortem organ donation
“In general, do you consent to having your organs or tissues donated after your 
death?” – “yes”/“no”
• proxy behavioral measure: clicking on donor card solicitation button
“By clicking on the following button you are forwarded to the webpage of the 
Federal Health Ministry, where you can directly create a donor card.” – “Create a 
donor card”
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Belief elicitation
• Identical format prior and posterior to the treatment (and after outcome 
measurements):
“What do you think: What percentage of the people in Germany in general consent 
to having their organs and tissues donated after their death?”
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The study: A descriptive norm manipulation experiment
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Social norm treatment: high prevalence condition
«80.4% of the German population consent to donating their organs after death
according to a representative survey.»
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Descriptive norm treatments: low/medium/high prevalence
 
 
 
Marc Höglinger Social norms and organ donation Seattle, August 19, 2016 17
Successful belief manipulation
Pre- and post-treatment beliefs about general consent rate by treatments
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No effect of descriptive norm treatments on the aggregate
Control-group baseline is 73%
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Effect of high treatment only for card non-holders
Control-group baseline card holders 88%, and 47% for the non-holders
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Model estimates (OLS, robust SE)
Marc Höglinger Social norms and organ donation Seattle, August 19, 2016 22
Conclusions
• A strong descriptive norm message (“80% of the population consents”) 
increased stated consent for subjects without a donor card, whereas 
card holders remained unaffected.
• Hence, the consent decision contains a interactive element: it matters, 
what others do.
• However, medium and weak descriptive norm messages showed no 
effect.
• Considering heterogeneity in social norm treatment effects is important.
−That card holders, i.e. subjects hat made up their mind regarding organ 
donation, are unaffected by normative treatments is in line with previous 
findings (Stutzer et al. 2011)
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Conclusions
• To better explain and predict effect differences related to the descriptive 
norm strength we should think more carefully about the exact 
mechanism why and the conditions when descriptive norms exert an 
effect.
−Only, if subjects do not have strong preferences? Only if the descriptive norm 
is sufficiently strong? How much is sufficiently?
• Restrictions of this study:
−Lack of statistical power for some analysis due to the astonishingly high rate 
of donor card holders of 63%!
−Results obtained for stated consent not corroborated with the second, 
unobtrusive behavioral outcome (clicking on card solicitation button). 
Insufficient power does not allow for any conclusion in this respect.
• Still, the results show that the organ donation consent decision is 
malleable by subtle normative influence – at least for subgroups of the 
population.
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Table 1: Observations by experimental condition 
 Control Low 
norm 
Medium 
norm 
High 
norm 
Total 
Assigned to treatment 134 150 137 130 551 
Elicitation pre-treatment belief 134 150 136 130 550 
stated donation consent 
(outcome measure one) 
134 150 137 128 549 
clicking on card solicitation 
button (outcome measure two) 
131 148 135 128 542 
Elicitation post-treatment 
belief 
129 143 132 124 528 
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Effects of medium norm treatment by card holders/non-
holders and under-/over-estimators
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Social norm treatment: low/medium/high condition
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Social norm treatment: low/medium/high condition
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Social norm treatment: low/medium/high condition
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Do defaults save lives? (Johnson & Goldstein 2003)
The effect of opt-out (presumed consent) on post-mortem donation rates
• Opt-out rule (vs. opt-in) is 
markedly correlated with 
−(registered) consent rates −(controlled) donation rates in Europe
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Active decisions and blood donation (Stutzer et al. 2011)
• Stutzer et al. (2011) used an 
«active decision» treatment (AD), 
where subjects were forced to 
actively make a choice in favour or 
against blood donation.
• This increased donation rates from 
5% to 12% relative to the control 
group - but only for those with 
weak preferences regarding blood 
donation.
• Argument: Valuing a public good 
and forming a preference is costly 
– many refrain from this and, 
therefore, do not contribute. 
Forcing a valuation overcomes this 
barrier to contribution.
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Do the right thing: but only if others do so (Bicchieri & Xiao 2009)
«Fair choices» lead to fair choices in the dictator game
• Bicchieri & Xiao 2009 exposed participants prior to a dictator game to 
selective results from previous sessions: the majority (60%) making fair 
vs. selfish choices
• Fair choices increased from 30% to 50% after exposure to results of a 
previous session where the majority made a fair choice (FC) vs. the 
selfish choice (SC).
SB: Selfish belief, SC: Selfish choice, FB: Fair belief, FC: Fair choice
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The power of social norms (SN)
• How can people be influenced using SN («SN-Marketing», e.g. Schultz 
2007)?
−focusing to a SN (Cialdini, Reno, Kallgren 1990)
−manipulating individuals beliefs with 
descriptive norms
• Social norm messaging campaigns: 
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Lifting the veil of ignorance: the contagiousness of norm 
violations
• Diekmann, Przepiorka and Rauhut 
2015 expose participants of a die-
cheating game (Fischbacher & 
Föllmi-Heusi 2013) to results from 
previous studies, where the high 
level of cheating becomes obvious.
Source: Lewis et al. 2012
Fischbacher & Föllmi-
Heusi 2013
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Lifting the veil of ignorance: the contagiousness of norm 
violations
• Their results suggest an increase in cheating between a first and a 
second round after exposure to results where norm-breaking behavior 
becomes evident.
info 0: control group
info 1: exposure to results
from Fischbacher & 
Föllmi-Heusi 2003
info 2: exposure to results
from round 1
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The constructive and destructive dynamic of beliefs
• Rauhut 2015, in a variation, exposed participants of a die-cheating 
game (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi 2013) to results from previous 
rounds, and performs separate analyses of «over-» and «under-» 
estimators of the descriptive norm. 
• His results show an increase in cheating for under-estimators, but a 
decrease in over-estimators between the first and the subsequent 
rounds after exposure to results from round one, where norm-breaking 
behavior becomes evident.
The constructive and destructive dynamic of beliefs
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Social norms and behavior: “Boomerang effect”?
• Descriptive norm information may 
in- or decrease a particular 
behavior – depending on the prior 
behavior level (Schultz et al. 
2007):
−Above-average energy users 
decreased consumption
−Below-average energy users 
increased their consumption
−But: emotional feedback (emoticons) 
made the latter effect disappear
Schultz et al. 2007
